The return of Donald Trump to the White House has been the subject of much speculation. What will happen to critical mineral projects? Aid budgets? The Lobito Corridor? Some have decried Trump’s return as disastrous for the continent, but is that really the case?

To gain a better understanding of how Trump 2.0 may affect African critical minerals, we first need to understand the importance of the US to Africa, and of Africa to the US.

US foreign direct investment on the continent peaked in 2009 and fell off a cliff until 2020, while China’s aggressive policy towards African resources – often called “infrastructure for resources deals” – remained strong until 2022. The continent is vast, and different geographies attract a variety of critical minerals players aside from the US and China, including Russia, India, Gulf nations, Italy, France, Australia, Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom, among others.

China is perhaps the most important in terms of critical minerals investments – for better and for worse, in growth and exploitation – while the US remains a nation that many Sub-Saharan leaders look to engage and attract (anti-Western regimes aside, that is), particularly where partnerships with Chinese entities yielded more woes than fruit. Arguably, China’s approach to Africa is of far more consequence to African leaders than that of the US due to the demand for critical minerals still being largely driven by China’s downstream industry. However, as concerns mount over economic and resource colonisation by China, looking for alternative partners remains a sensible approach to limiting overreliance on a single nation.

Can we expect an increase in critical mineral project funding from the US? Perhaps. But this will depend on several factors, including the rate at which US domestic sources can be unlocked, trends in real-time demand, GDP growth, and availability of cheap ore from other jurisdictions. We are far less likely to see a scattered approach focusing on minerals alone, instead, more emphasis to be placed on infrastructure enabling the re-direction of the flow of ore and concentrates towards the west coast of Africa and onto the US – the development of Lobito Corridor is likely to continue, although its completion may well lay in the hands of another administration. The case for investing in African projects will also need to be compelling against the background of high-risk and security priorities.