1. Sub-Saharan Africa at the centre again

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has become a centre of attraction in recent years, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, for many developed economies such as the USA, Europe, China and emerging Gulf players. This is due to the sub-region’s vast mineral resources of cobalt, copper, lithium, and tantalum, among others, which are essential for green energy, defence, and digital technologies of the future. These geopolitical players have intensified efforts to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from China, which dominates most segments of the sector for processing to downstream segments like cell components, batteries and electric vehicles.

In the wake of this surge, multilateral initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) and investments in alternative supply chains, such as the Lobito Corridor linking DRC-Zambia-Angola, reflect this strategy. The United States also, in June 2025, brokered a peace deal between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, focused on bringing lasting peace to the Great Lakes region and building a framework for regional economic growth opportunities, including the region’s vast mineral resources. In August 2025, media also reported on the UK and Zimbabwe seeking to renew diplomatic ties after almost three decades of tension between the two, especially following the former’s controversial land reforms of the late 1990s. The UK-Zimbabwe ‘geo-mance’, which has been christened as a “mission for economic growth” by UK senior government officials, is expected to lead to “a win-win situation” for both countries with a proposed US$1 billion of prospective deals across key sectors such as critical minerals and agriculture.

These initiatives are about more than security; they are about who processes Africa’s minerals and where the value lies. The question is whether they also expand reliable power and local processing in SSA—or simply speed ore to ships. Resource geopolitics will continue to increasingly shape diplomatic and economic engagements, with global powers vying for influence in SSA. However, this renewed competition has also brought to the fore the role of African agency in changing the old extractivist model of “mine to port,” which did not add much value or structurally transform many African economies.

Mining is not new to the continent: in fact, several economies such as Zambia, South Africa, DRC, Ghana and Guinea have a significant share of their economies dominated by the sector as indicated by minerals rents and other indicators. Nevertheless, many of these African economies remain at the bottom of many rankings of economic development, be it composite indices of human development such as the Human Development Index; economic competitiveness and innovation such as the Global Competitiveness Index; or governance, corruption and rule of law such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators or the Resource Governance Index, among others. Let me illustrate the earlier point with the case of electricity. Present estimates indicate that 600 million people, or 50% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 1.21 billion population, lack access to electricity. This access deficit is even more acute in Western, Central and Eastern Africa, where some of these mineral-endowed countries, such as the DRC and Mozambique, have rates below 35%. Even in countries with high access rates, the lack of supply has made power rationing more onerous, as recent examples from South Africa (2013-2016) and Ghana (2023) demonstrate. For Sub-Saharan Africa, especially, to industrialise, electricity consumption has to increase more than tenfold from the current average per capita consumption (excluding South Africa) of 180 kilowatt-hours (kWh). This compares with 13,000 kWh per capita in the United States and 6,500 kWh in Europe.

However, all hope is not lost, as many resource-rich SSA governments are now seeking to change this narrative and are increasingly reluctant to export raw ore, instead insisting on in-country and/or regional processing. Since 2022, over 20 SSA countries, including Angola, Guinea, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, have imposed restrictions or banned raw-material exports in an attempt to pressure mining companies to build processing plants, according to the OECD (Figure 1).

This raises two fundamental questions. Firstly, how can SSA assert itself amidst the increasing role of different geopolitical actors seeking access to its prized mineral and other energy resources to meet their supply chain derisking strategies, while also ensuring it improves developmental outcomes for the sub-region? What financing opportunities are there for developing inclusive mineral value chains that not only focus on export but also support energy production from the continent’s vast energy potential while addressing the realities of justice and equity in critical/transition mineral governance?

Figure 1 Commodities trade restrictions, 2025

Source: OECD

2. New partnerships but same old colonial extractivist model?

Africa has significant energy resources to power its mineral and energy needs, as well as the world. The continent accounts for about 30% of the world’s mineral reserves and 12% and 8% of the world’s oil and natural gas reserves. In addition, Africa also has 40% of the world’s gold, about 90% of its chromium and platinum, and the largest reserves of cobalt, diamonds, platinum and uranium. Regarding oil and gas, the continent accounts for 7% of the world’s proven oil reserves, with estimated proven reserves of 125.1 billion barrels and a reserves-to-production ratio of 49.8 years as of end-2020.

Natural gas is also a core component of many African countries’ energy mix and has enormous potential to bridge the energy access deficit. The continent was estimated to have 455 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas at the end of 2022, making it the fifth-largest gas reserves holder globally after the Middle East (40.3%), CIS Region (30.1%), Asia Pacific (8.8%) and North America (8.1%), according to BP statistics. Discoveries by nascent players like Mozambique, Tanzania, Mauritania and Senegal hold the prospect of domestic gas-powered industrialisation in substituting for expensive LNG imports, especially for power generation, and for regional and international exports. For example, Mozambique is positioning itself to export gas to neighbouring South Africa via pipeline. It is these vast resources that keep drawing geopolitical actors into the sub-region.

The EU’s green transition and resource diplomacy

Brussels has signed various MoUs with five African states – DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, and Zambia─ aimed at integrating raw material value chains, mobilising funding for development and infrastructure, cooperating on sustainable production, and capacity building, among others.

To give impetus to these MoUs, the EU is co-financing the Lobito Corridor under Global Gateway alongside the United States, African Finance Corporation and others. Feasibility studies are ongoing. In October 2024, KoBold Metals, a U.S. mining company with assets in Zambia, was reported to have signed an MOU with AFC to become the anchor customer for the Zambia-Lobito rail project. AFC is collaborating with KoBold on the Mingomba project in the following areas: project development funding, equity, or debt financing as required. Additionally, the EU’s offer to African countries emphasises stronger environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards, and closer cooperation on research and innovation along the raw materials value chain. The latter includes advanced exploration, earth observation, innovative extractive, processing, refining and recycling technologies (circular economy).

Nevertheless, there are concerns that an overconcentration on stricter ESG standards may force European finance institutions and DFIs to back away from supporting actual African mining projects needed to provide the raw materials base. Without actual mining, there would be next to nothing to transport along the railway corridor, making it economically viable. Such high ESG standards come amidst complications with European climate policies, such as the exclusion of mining from the EU sustainable finance taxonomy, which makes it even more challenging to de-risk their supply chains from China.

Figure 2 Proposed route of the Lobito Corridor

Source: EU Commission

The U.S. strategy: securing supply chains and countering China

The United States’ engagement with Africa is not new. However, the recent developments in critical minerals diplomacy and geoeconomics in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly involving the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, and the United States, highlight the complex interplay between resource extraction, conflict resolution, and economic interests. The scope of the negotiations between the DRC and the US is ambitious, “combining giving US companies access to lithium, cobalt and coltan deposits in return for investment in infrastructure and mines”. It indicates a multifaceted approach of marrying diplomatic and economic interests in the region.

If successful, the deal could allow for billions of dollars of investment, backed by the US private sector development lending body, the International Development Finance Corporation, in mines, infrastructure and metal processing plants. The benefits of this would be mutually reinforcing: boost local economies in terms of jobs and productivity gains while giving the US a strategic foothold in a region rich in resources crucial for advanced technologies. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how aspects of the agreement to address long-standing issues of illicit mineral trade in the region will be implemented. In parallel, public–private finance is being mobilised through the Lobito Corridor—advanced with G7 partners— to move copper and cobalt west using the Atlantic seaboard as an alternative to China-centred routes. Together, these initiatives frame a U.S. “de-risking” strategy that mixes security guarantees with corridor logistics and investment.

China’s existing dominance in SSA and rising African agency

China controls most aspects of CRM supply chains globally and also in SSA. Nevertheless, we are seeing an increase in the bargaining power of African countries in pushing for increased fiscal take and also more domestic refining and processing. This is amply demonstrated in the recent Sicomines minerals-for-infrastructure audit and renegotiation. In 2007–08, an agreement was signed between the DRC government (Gécamines) and a Chinese consortium (CREC/China Railway and Sinohydro) for the Sicomines project – Sino-Congolese mining. The Chinese investors obtained a 68% stake in the copper-cobalt joint-venture under a resource-backed loan arrangement in which the Chinese party would spend US$6 billion to build roads and hospitals, and another US$3 billion for mine development, serviced by future copper–cobalt revenues. The deal faced heavy domestic and international criticism for being one-sided, overly generous in its tax concessions, and was thus subjected to multiple rounds of renegotiation and restructuring. Scrutiny intensified in 2021–23, culminating in a state auditor review that criticised delivery against pledges: there was under-execution on infrastructure pledges (about 30% delivery) and called for renegotiation. In early 2024, Kinshasa and the Chinese partners announced revised terms increasing the infrastructure commitment up to US$7 billion as well as a 1.2% royalty to the state, and Gecamines having the right to market 32% of the mine’s production, while leaving ownership unchanged. Kinshasa has asserted greater bargaining power, albeit after much pressure from other actors.

Gulf states: capital and logistics as entry strategy

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also becoming visible investors in African minerals, often combining sovereign capital with comparatively advantaged logistics platforms. In April 2024, Saudi-backed Manara Minerals closed a US$2.5 billion purchase of 10% of Vale Base Metals, which would become a vehicle for acquiring global battery mineral assets. In December 2023, Abu Dhabi’s International Resources Holding (IRH) in December 2023 announced the takeover of 51% of Mopani Copper Mines (MCM) in a US$1.1 billion deal. The company is seeking to acquire more assets in the Copperbelt and beyond. In June 2025, media reported that IRH had acquired a US$367 million 56% majority stake in the Bisie tin mine operated by Toronto-listed Alphamin Resource in eastern DRC, underscoring its growth and risk appetite. The shares were initially held by a US private equity group, Denham Capital.

On the logistics side, UAE’s DP World is expanding its presence with a planned US$3 billion investment in African ports and transportation infrastructure over the next few years. Some of the new developments include the new deep-water Port of Ndayane (Senegal) and the Banana port project (DRC), as well as investments to enhance logistics businesses, including road and rail infrastructure, and to develop special economic zones. Such port investments would link upstream mining operations to export corridors that can serve regional and global battery-metal supply chains.

India’s strategic moves: balancing China and securing options

In July 2025, New Delhi sent a team of geologists to Zambia for a three-year copper-cobalt exploration programme as part of the country’s ambitious plans to access CRMs. The Zambian government had agreed to allocate 9,000 square km to India for cobalt exploration. India is seeking similar exploration-related deals with neighbouring DRC and Tanzania. Likewise, in Namibia, a high-level visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in July 2025 resulted in the two countries signing cooperation agreements in various sectors, including CRMs, with public messaging stressing partnership. Like other geopolitical actors, India’s CRMs diplomacy with Africa is premised on the formation of joint ventures across the value chain from exploration to beneficiation as well as skills transfer. Nevertheless, the fact that the Zambian deal indicates that most of the analysis will be done in laboratories in India raises concerns about whether a true partnership would manifest.

3. This time is different: Asserting African agency

To seize the shared opportunities as a result of the renewed geopolitical interest and tackle common challenges, I propose three mutually reinforcing actions that both parties, especially external actors must prioritise in their engagement with the sub-region: (1) catalysing multilateral investments to reduce Africa’s energy access deficit; (2) securing sustainable critical minerals supply chains; and (3) supporting value addition in the context of mineral processing.

3.1  Energy access as a condition precedent

The foremost priority for many African countries is securing the necessary investments to upgrade existing and build new energy systems. To that extent, external actors can and must help African countries attract the funding required to develop both renewable energy and natural gas projects in Africa, with a particular focus on solar, wind, and hydrogen projects. This can be done through by advocating for the rechannelling of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) into financing climate action in Africa with emphasis on both mitigation and adaptation:  While Africa’s contribution to global GHGs remains under 4%, the continent is among the most vulnerable to the impact of extreme weather events. Compounding this is the fact that many countries in the region face persistent debt sustainability challenges, limiting their ability to finance the investments needed to address climate change.

Africa needs US$2.8 trillion (US$280 billion annually) by 2030 to implement its nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement; this is almost equivalent to the continent’s entire GDP of US$3 trillion in 2022. Actual climate finance flows to Africa were just US$30 billion in 2020, just 11% of the annual target and only 3% of global climate finance. Such rechanneling of the SDRs can be done through multilateral development banks such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) to finance climate action on the continent. These monies would provide catalytic financing for new renewable energy and climate-resilient investments on the continent. During the pandemic in August 2021, the IMF issued US$650 billion in SDRs to member countries to address the health emergency at no cost and without conditions attached; thus, this did not create new debt. However, many of the high-income countries, including China, did not use up their SDRs.

Additionally, African countries could be assisted with technical assistance to design and launch new financing instruments such as green bonds, and other environmental, social and governance (ESG) instruments. Some of these sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs), a financing tool used at the sovereign level by Chile and other countries in recent times, have key performance criteria that have to be met (such as gender criteria) without restricting the use of proceeds to environmental or social purposes. It is worth noting, though, that these ESG funds still add to African countries’ existing debt burdens.

Lastly, given that the EU has included natural gas and nuclear energy in the EU taxonomy under the Complementary Delegated Act (CDA), which is a key component of the EU’s sustainable finance agenda, the EU can support African countries, especially those with significant natural gas endowments, to utilise this for domestic power generation and LNG exports. The CDA provides a means for EU financial institutions to continue financing natural gas projects on the continent, albeit with stricter environmental requirements. [1] Beyond power generation, countries with significant gas resources, such as Nigeria, could also be encouraged to produce blue hydrogen from natural gas using carbon capture technology, thereby mitigating emissions for use in heavy industry.

Securing sustainable critical minerals supply chains

SSA provides unique advantages to help increase and diversify the CRM supply chains through friend-shoring initiatives. For Europe, for example, SSA can help meet its external sourcing requirement of “not more than 65% of the Union’s annual consumption of each strategic raw material at any relevant stage of processing from a single third country”. The EU has already taken steps by signing various strategic partnerships with several African countries under the Global Gateway Project. Yet, a fully detailed roadmap and action plans are missing.

While these objectives are noble, the availability of sourcing these sustainable CRMs is fundamentally dependent on the willingness of the EU and other partners to provide the necessary financial support and investment de-risking instruments (including guarantees). As illustrated in a study, finance in the form of concessional loans, grants, blended funds, and export credits will play a significant role, especially at the early stages of mining and infrastructure projects.

Supporting value addition in the context of mineral processing

As argued earlier, given that African countries are late industrialisers, respective governments see the energy transition as a second chance opportunity to finally industrialise their economies through value addition and technology transfers, among others. This is especially the case when it comes to CRMs, where beneficiation requirements are beginning to play a bigger role in respective African country economic, trade and industrial policies.

SSA’s external partners have an excellent opportunity to work collectively with African countries in a manner that supports the latter’s industrialisation goals while meeting the former’s mineral security aspirations. It need not be a zero-sum game. Financing instruments, including loans and export credits, can be used to de-risk, mobilise and catalyse the needed private sector investments in African countries to add value within the CRM chain: for example, in manufacturing precursor cells and other EV components for exports or domestic consumption. Promoting regional cooperation across value chains in the case of CRMs, which emphasises the development of joint infrastructure, such as the Lobito Corridor, research and innovation, policy and market alignment, will significantly help in risk mitigation, job creation, and energy security, among others.

4. Conclusions

The scramble for Africa’s critical minerals is reshaping global alliances and economic strategies. While the U.S. and EU seek to counter China, African nations are navigating these rivalries to maximise benefits for themselves. The DRC-Rwanda-US deal is just one example of how mineral wealth is driving diplomacy. By linking resource access with conflict resolution and economic development, this approach attempts to address multiple issues simultaneously. As Gulf states, India, and others also enter the fray, Sub-Saharan Africa must balance foreign investment with sustainable development to avoid past exploitation traps.

Sub-Saharan Africa should leverage these mineral and energy resources to address its pervasive energy and industrialisation needs. The sub-region cannot afford not to industrialise or fail the 600 million people (50% of the 1.21 billion population) that lack access to electricity. The two are not mutually exclusive.

[1] For example, gas power plants would be categorised as green if “they emit less than 270g of CO2 equivalent per kWh, or have annual emissions below 550kg CO2e per kW over 20 years”. This means that certain new projects that could benefit from EU funding and related concessions must introduce measures such as carbon capture and storage to attract funding.